

29 AUG 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Strategic Research

SUBJECT : OSR/FMSAC Coordination

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1. The attached memorandum says in effect that OSR embarked on a line of research which was outside its charter, beyond its technical capability, and that the result was wrong answers. I agree completely. It is also symptomatic of the recurring problems we have in working harmoniously with OSR. Many of my people believe that OSR should be restricted to counting holes in the ground and that we should do all of the remaining analysis on strategic missile systems. It is also quite probable that the analysts in OSR feel that FMSAC ought to be restricted to counting launches and that the bulk of the analysis of strategic weapon systems should be done by OSR.

2. There ought to be a reasonable way of cutting up the pie without getting into jurisdictional disputes and fights over coordination. Do you have any ideas to put forward?

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DAVID S. BRANDWEIN

Director

Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center

Attachments:

Review of OSR Report  
OSR Report

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Addressee w/atts.  
1 - D/FMSAC  
1 - C/PS  
1 - FMSAC/Chrono

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An Outline of Agency Research and Development  
Coordination Effort

Several events in the Fall of 1965 stimulated interest in improved Agency-wide coordination and control of technical activities and work. A charter for the Science and Technology Directorate was circulated to the other Directorates for comment; the Inspector General's Report on NPIC indicated serious technical problems and lack of coordination with other Agency technical elements; and, at the same time, problems of policy and objectives pertaining to the NRO indicated a similar need for a single point of responsibility in that area also. (TS)

DDP concern about a proposed S&T charter

In a memo to the DDS dated 2 August 1965, [ ] Chief, Operational Services, DDP, expressed reservations about the draft of a proposed revision of [ ] "Statement of Mission and Functions of DD/S&T." The Plans Directorate was concerned about the relationship of S&T Directorate activities to similar work conducted within Plans. [ ] argued that Plans was responsible for agent related technical activities, with long range research support conducted by S&T. [ ] feared that the proposed statement would allow S&T to intervene in operational matters and activities abroad, and that infringement on Plan's responsibilities [ ] would

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25X1 also occur. [ ] memoranda were referred to DDP and DD/S&T by the DDS with a suggestion that they meet to resolve these issues. The pertinent memoranda comprise Tab A.

S&T assistance to NPIC

The Director requested Dr. Wheelon to determine what could be done by the S&T Directorate to help NPIC, and at the DD/S&T's direction, I studied the Inspector General's report on NPIC and the NPIC White Paper, abstracted pertinent portions of these documents, and developed some recommendations on how S&T could assist in reducing or eliminating the deficiencies. I informally discussed these recommendations with [ ] and submitted them to the DD/S&T on 24 August. In essence, formal program review conducted jointly by NPIC and the technical components responsible for the development of reconnaissance systems was recommended to improve communication between these two groups, and provide a timely opportunity for NPIC to contribute to over-all reconnaissance system design.

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Difficult personal relationships between the DDI and the DD/S&T, and a generally unsettled environment in NRO activities resulted in no immediate implementation of assistance. I re-raised the over-all problem to Dr. Wheelon on 15 September, but as late as 15 November 1968 he still felt the environment was not receptive and no action has

yet been taken along these lines. Memoranda pertaining to this comprise Tab B.

Factors pertinent to early over-all R&D coordination organizational structure

The problems of coordinating the S&T charter, the formal recognition of inadequate communication and assistance between NPIC and S&T Directorate, and similar factors, resulted in a discussion by Wheelon of the over-all problem of R&D coordination within the Agency with R. Chapman, J. Blake and I late in August. Wheelon requested drafts of a charter for submission to the DCI which would put the DD/S&T in an authoritative position over all Agency technical activity. I believe that while travelling by plane from New York to Washington, Adm. Raborn had personally told Dr. Wheelon that he had come to the conclusion that he needed this sort of organizational arrangement to both simplify and strengthen Agency R&D efforts.

Chapman, Blake, and I developed separate papers which we then discussed. The drafts by Chapman and Blake emphasized permissive coordination and a somewhat piecemeal assumption of responsibility by the DD/S&T, whereas I proposed a straightforward single manager concept with direct authority across the board. Shortly after Blake, Chapman and I had discussed these papers Blake and I discussed them

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with Dr. Wheelon.

On 8 September, Blake wrote a memorandum to Dr. Wheelon in which he discussed the philosophical differences in the approach to this charter. He also raised the important question of my position as Special Assistant since Office Directors would generally be responsive to the Special Assistant if the drafts were implemented. Blake felt that this, together with Chapman's exclusion from the discussion of the drafts, would have a very adverse effect upon Chapman's morale. Although Wheelon had originally intended for me to work under his direct guidance to achieve meaningful supervision of all Agency NRO activities, his personal role in this program changed substantially in the Fall of 1965, and he turned his efforts and mine to the problem of improving the agency sponsored R&D work both technically and administratively. The initial drafts and Blake's memorandum comprise Tab C.

Blake brought the memoranda written by [ ] and the DDS request that DDP and DD/S&T resolve the charter discussions (Tab A), to Dr. Wheelon's attention in a memorandum of 14 September. Blake had arranged for a hiatus in this discussion, and recommended that Wheelon move promptly with Adm. Raborn and Mr. Helms to discuss the draft directive assigning over-all technical responsibility to the DD/S&T. In this memorandum Blake also said the primary reason

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for contention and fear on the part of DDP was ORD's technical activities encroaching upon their bailiwick. This problem had been recognized very early by Wheelon, and I believe this resulted in his desire to not associate the DD/S&T role for the Agency technical program too closely with ORD's activities which were clearly competitive. Blake's memorandum of 14 September is Tab D.

Drafts and redrafts

Numerous drafts of a notice to be issued by the DCI dealing with the problem of centralized authority for technical activity in the Agency were prepared beginning with the initial drafts in Tab C. This activity involved frequent discussions with the Executive Director and culminated in a draft regulation which was circulated to the Deputy Directors for comment on 21 March 1966. Discussion of the highlights and preparation of these drafts will be covered later, since they will be more meaningful in view of other actions which transpired during the October - March period.

S&T attempts to help NPIC

To have an on-hand capability to assist NPIC, improve communications, and coordinate effort between ORD and NPIC, Dr. Wheelon hired [REDACTED]

This was consistent with the over-all concept to improve the [REDACTED]

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relationship between ORD and the technical components of other Directorates by having technical liaison officers on the staff of the DD/S&T physically located with the supported component. These officers on S&T career service were to fill a new slot in the supported component's organization and report directly to that component's director. Since [ ] enjoyed a good reputation and relationship with NPIC through his participation on various panels, it was anticipated that he could carry out this assignment with little difficulty. Further, the liaison officer position was structured so as to be as free of organizational bias as possible; in particular, the liaison officer would not be a direct representative of ORD. Mr. Blake and I discussed the broad role of the liaison officer (called a coordinator at that time) with NPIC representatives, and they objected to having a coordinator as a part of their organization. Further, they felt that his role should be primarily that of advisor, and this was considerably less influential than Dr. Wheelon's concept. To be of maximum assistance in this particular situation the liaison officer was expected to assess current NPIC programs, determine what ORD work should be injected or initiated, and work for implementation at the Director, NPIC-DD/S&T level. Dr. Cline informally sent [ ] memo to Wheelon requesting his comment prior to his signing it, and on 2 November Blake advised that the

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memo be brushed off so as not to interfere with the establishment of the Agency-wide responsibility which was then being actively discussed with the Executive Director. The [ ] Cline, Blake memoranda are Tab E.

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Clarke memo on R&D coordination

Although the over-all R&D management problem had been discussed primarily with the Executive Director, there was a general awareness of this activity, and John Clarke wrote a Memorandum for the Record on this subject on 3 November. In this memorandum Clarke approached the problem of R&D coordination in terms of budget review and defense, but also cited requests by him to ORD to have meetings with other R&D elements in order to preclude duplication and generally improve communications. While not proposing a long range institutionalized solution to the broad problem, Clarke did note that the technical elements did not make use of available information, and Project Officers seemed to have little interest and initiative in determining what other R&D components might be doing. He further noted that the Research and Development Review Board had not been active or useful, and that a more formal method of coordination was needed. Clarke's memorandum is attached as Tab F.

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TSD steps toward coordination with ORD

The Director of TSD initiated a memorandum on 24 September to forward the long range technical needs of the clandestine services to the S&T Directorate - and to ORD in particular. They also proposed guidelines for handling the TSD interface with ORD within a more formal framework. This memorandum was approved 10 November by the A/DDP. Bob Chapman noted on the routing slip to Dr. Wheelon that the TSD proposals might provide a working basis for discussions. At Dr. Wheelon's request I subsequently commented on the proposal in generally favorable terms.

The TSD memorandum, in effect, gave further expression to the earlier DDP comments (Tab A) expressing concern over ORD encroachment into their operational responsibilities and the unilateral efforts of ORD to do research or development work in support of DDP in which DDP was either unwitting or in disagreement. Both directly and indirectly, TSD maintained that technical support to the Clandestine Services would be most effective if requirements flowed out of the Clandestine Services and new technical proposals flowed into the Clandestine Services via TSD. The DDP memoranda, Mr. Chapman's comments, and my memorandum comprise Tab G.

During this entire period budget defense was especially active.

Dr. Wheelon was called upon to represent all the technical efforts of the Agency and defend the budgets. This required considerable intercourse with NPIC, TSD and COMMO. The offices provided exemplars of equipment and techniques which they had developed and provided the backup, justifications and priorities for their planned future programs and budgets. This budget defense activity tended to reinforce the general impression that the DD/S&T would have broader responsibilities for the total Agency technical program, and provided a common cause for developing a cooperative environment.

DDCI meeting on Agency R&D management

The DDCI, Mr. Helms, held a staff meeting attended by the Deputy Directors and their principal technical assistants on 3 December 1965. In this meeting Mr. Helms said that the total Agency technical effort had to be coordinated, defended, and controlled by a single person. He laid to rest certain fears that all technical components would be transferred to the DD/S&T, or that all R&D efforts would be funded from a single "bank" unilaterally operated by the DD/S&T. Mr. Helms also pointed out that Dr. Wheelon would have a principal officer in DD/S&T to carry on the daily business required to achieve the objectives. When asked for comment, the DD/P indicated that he had no quarrel with

the principles involved and, in fact, there was little objection except in the case of NPIC. Mr. Lundahl objected primarily along political lines, and stressed the freedom he felt NPIC must have in order to retain its unique position as a "community" asset. This argument was rejected by Helms, and after further discussion he requested full cooperation and support of the various Directorates in this matter. Dr. Wheelon's cryptic notes from this meeting are Tab H.

Coordinated audio [ ] programs

Some setbacks in covert audio operations occurred at about this time. TSD and ORD had independently discussed various technical alternatives and the funds required to improve this situation with elements of the Plans Directorate, and ultimately the Executive Director asked the DD/S&T to coordinate and consolidate these ideas into a single audio program prior to requesting release of [ ] from reserve funds. At Dr. Wheelon's direction, I held two independent meetings with TSD and ORD representatives in order to reduce the hostility between these two groups to a point at which I felt a joint meeting could be productive. A coordinated program was then quickly developed and forwarded to the Executive Director by the DD/S&T on 14 January 1966. The forwarding memo is attached as Tab I.

beginning. To avoid the numerous pitfalls which had in other instances resulted in hard feelings and misunderstandings, it was arranged that the DD/S&T and those supporting him in these Agency-wide activities would operate independently of the normal S&T Directorate procedures when the S&T procedures would infringe. For this reason I maintained the only complete file on these activities.

Drafts of Agency notice on R&D responsibility

The series of drafts of the directive to establish the responsibilities for Agency technical activities deserves some comment since they illuminate several important discussions and decisions. The original draft written 3 September appears in Tab C. Wheelon wrote a version of the draft on 17 October which was revised once on 18 October, twice on 19 October, and twice on 20 October. Wheelon wrote another draft on 25 October which was rewritten on 12 November, 23 February, 1 March, 2 March and 4 March with the last draft essentially the draft directive which was issued by the Executive Director to the Deputy Directors for comment. The concept of a single point of responsibility was maintained throughout all the drafts. The importance of security was also evident throughout all the drafts which reflected changes in implementation details, the administrative location of the Special Assistant who would perform the day-to-day job and similar particulars.

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The rather bare initial draft was fleshed out to include description of the implementation process in the draft of 19 October. In this draft the use of representatives from the DD/S&T to each non-Directorate technical component was spelled out, and a Review Board was described similar to the one which had been proposed as a bridge so that the S&T Directorate could better assist NPIC. In general, the early drafts referred to the responsible person as the R&D Manager.

Mr. Clarke prepared a draft on 16 December which differed from those which Dr. Wheelon and I had prepared by emphasizing a staff responsibility of the "Agency RD&E Officer" to the DCI on community as well as Agency technical matters. He further recommended the establishment of an Executive Committee for RD&E to assist and advise this Agency RD&E Officer: this committee would replace the R&D Review Board which was on the books but ineffective. Clarke's draft was generally unacceptable to Dr. Wheelon because it called upon the RD&E Officer as a staff advisor to insure technical efforts were conducted effectively, but provided no means or authorities.

Later drafts referred to the responsible officer as a Coordinator, Manager, Special Assistant, and, in the title of the draft notice which was ultimately issued this title designation was simply

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avoided in favor of "Coordination Responsibility for Research, Development, and Engineering".

There was considerable doubt as to whether or not the DD/S&T could be objective in this staff responsibility to the Director with quasi line authority, and, at the same time be the Deputy Director of the S&T Directorate. The idea of a super Technical Director was never seriously considered, and the basic search was for a structure which was workable in terms of achieving the objectives and sufficiently credible in terms of being objective and non-parochial to be acceptable to the other Directorates. For example, in the draft of 23 February the "Coordinator" was administratively A Special Assistant in the Office of the DD/S&T. The 1 March draft specified that the "Director of RD&E" would function in a staff capacity to all Deputy Directors and would be administratively housed as a Special Assistant to the DD/S&T. In the 2 March draft, this officer was still described as a Special Assistant in the Office of the DD/S&T who would function in a staff capacity to all Deputy Directors. This general concept remained in the draft of [ ] which was circulated by the Executive Director for comment. I urged this particular arrangement so that problems could be ironed out below the Deputy Director level because I believed the objectives could be most effectively accomplished if

each Deputy Director could look upon the Special Assistant as an impartial technical staff advisor. This would preclude the appearance of second-guessing of the other Deputy Directors by the DD/S&T.

The more significant drafts prepared by Dr. Wheelon and I, together with Clarke's draft are attached as Tab J.

Deputy Directors' and other comments on proposed implementation

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[ ]

The comments of the Directorates were generally favorable. DD/I, for example, endorsed the concept, suggested some changes in language, and suggested that their RD&E programs not be reviewed below \$50,000. The DD/S also suggested a lower limit of \$50,000, expressed some concern about potential delay in processing of contracts, and noted that Program Directors might feel relieved of some of their responsibility, since approval authority was being spread by this process. The DD/P also agreed with the objectives, recommended a lower limit of \$50,000. The DD/P took this opportunity to again raise the point which had been previously stated in the 2 August memoranda pertaining to the S&T Directorate charter, i. e., appropriate review by the Plans Directorate should be provided for those projects within the S&T Directorate which were alleged to be in support of Plans. Except for the requirement for review without regard to dollar value, all Deputy Directors were essentially in agreement with the proposed objectives and the implementation spelled out in

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John Clarke also reviewed the draft and recommended a number of changes which would have considerably reduced the authority of the Agency Coordinator and tend to place him in support of the Executive Director-Comptroller and the Director of PPB rather than the DCI.

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The memoranda of the Deputy Directors and Mr. Clarke, which were brought to me for delivery to Dr. Wheelon by Mr. Knoche early in May, comprise Tab L.

The comments of the offices are incomplete, but no basic problems appear in those of OEL, OSP and OSA except that the procedures pertaining to NRO programs would necessarily have to be exempt. These memoranda comprise Tab M.

Need for guidance to Project Officers

Through the review of proposed contract actions within S&T, it had become clearly apparent that the differences in procedures and the quality of the R&D effort was as varied within the S&T Directorate as it was between technical components of the Agency. It was also clear that existing instructions, administrative and otherwise, were woefully inadequate so that one was forced to continually indicate what was wrong rather than being able to point to a comprehensive procedure which would provide guidance for doing things right. In view of the fact it would be highly desirable to improve the procedures within S&T, and to learn from these as much as possible prior to attempting to improve the over-all Agency R&D activities, I proposed that a Project Officers Handbook be prepared which could provide guidance at a level of detail needed by the Project Officer. I had hoped that

this Handbook could be written by the S&T Administrative Staff and thereby avoid, insofar as possible, contradictions with existing directives and procedures, and described the necessary content for such a Handbook to the Executive Officer in a memorandum of 27 April which is attached as Tab N. In view of the anticipated near term delegation of total Agency R&D responsibility to the DD/S&T progress was inadequate for a variety of reasons, so I proceeded to draft the Handbook myself with the objective of completing the more critical sections so they could be introduced at the beginning of FY 67. These sections dealt primarily with the procedures for preparing and submitting contract packages for approval, and the procedures, nomenclature, etc., required to implement automatic data processing which was recognized to be especially critical if an over-all Agency plan and operation were to be meaningful. These key Handbook sections were ready for issuance by 1 July.

Effects of changes of executive personnel and other events

Adm. Raborn left the Agency on 29 June<sup>1966</sup>. Shortly thereafter Dr. Wheelon raised the question of the single responsible officer for Agency research and development effort with his successor, Mr. Helms. At that time Mr. Helms said he intended to proceed and was anxious to do so, but that he intended to wait for a short

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period before introducing any changes as substantial as that required.

Procurement practices, including R&D procurement, was surveyed, and the results reported in what is commonly referred to as [REDACTED] Based on preliminary briefings on the findings of this group, Dr. Wheelon requested that I examine the proposed Notice to see if it was consistent with the Committee's findings, which it was.

I continued to develop the remaining portions of the Project Officers Handbook and completed drafts were circulated to the Office Directors for comment not long after Dr. Wheelon's departure on 27 September. Complete drafts of the Handbook were given to the Office of Logistics and to TSD for their information, and comments were solicited. Subsequent to coordination with the Administrative Staff and the various offices of DD/S&T, the Handbook was printed in early January 1967. Distribution of the Handbook was then made to all Project Officers in DD/S&T, and copies were also provided to the various other elements of the Agency concerned with R&D including those dealing with planning, contracting and administration.

The guidance provided by the Handbook was followed by

DD/S&T Project Officers beginning 1 April 1967 except for some particulars pertaining to the Contract Information System. Discussions were held with TSD, NPIC, and COMMO, and it was determined that the Handbook was generally consistent with their practices when certain allowances were made for some detailed differences in office procedure.

In order to improve the description of technical fields in the Handbook and to use definitions of the type of R&D work which were more consistent with general practice, a revision was issued to all Handbooks early in June. Some technical fields which had originally appeared in the Handbook were dropped because they were not pertinent to Agency functions, and new fields were added. At the same time, the functional descriptions of the type of R&D work were changed to those employed by the Department of Defense to conform to more common usage.

In the Spring of 1967 a coordinated R&D program for audio was developed under the auspices of O/PPB. The general problems encountered in coordinating the program a year earlier (described in page 10) were again encountered by PPB.

In view of this generally unsatisfactory procedure, a series of meetings were held beginning May 24th at the initiative of

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Sid Gottlieb, DDP, to determine the problem areas extant between ORD and TSD with the objective of resolving these problems and improving the over-all efficiency of their mutual operations. [redacted] S. Gottlieb, [redacted] of DDP and [redacted] and [redacted] of S&T comprised the ad hoc Committee which met daily to consider these problems. It was quickly apparent that lasting improvement in the ORD/TSD interface was dependent upon an over-all environment within the Agency which would realistically foster R&D coordination. Consequently, the draft Agency Notice prepared some 14 months earlier was revived, and after some minor changes to improve the clarification, adopted as descriptive of the framework and operations which would be required to achieve an over-all Agency R&D coordination. The series of meetings resulted in a joint memo to the Executive Director-Comptroller from the DDP and DD/S&T outlining the current situation, endorsing the objectives of the draft Agency Notice and concurring with a Memorandum of Understanding detailing ORD/TSD relationships. The joint memorandum with attachments is Tab. O.

Because the joint memorandum and the attachments did not completely convey some of the concepts developed in the meetings, a Memorandum for the Record detailing additional facets was signed

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by the participants. This memorandum is provided as Tab P.

With some slight additional editorial changes, the draft Notice was issued 17 July 1967. The most significant change which has been made from the draft of some 15 months earlier dealt with the manner in which Agency R&D programs would be monitored by the DD/S&T. The objectives to be achieved were left unchanged, i. e., subsequent to planning the DD/S&T was to monitor the execution of the program, maintain accurate records, etc. Because of the confusion and uncertainty about just what this would entail and how it would be done, the published Notice merely said that the R&D program would be monitored by a procedure acceptable to all the Directorates. The Agency Notice is Tab Q.

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## CONSUMER EVAL OF FMSAC EVENT REPORTS

A review of the usefulness, adequacy and distribution of M/S Event Reports was conducted early in 1967. Jan-March a questionnaire for consumers was included in four MER and 4 SER.

A high proportion of customers responded (78% overall, 93% outside Agency, 56% inside)

Reports are of considerable value and should be continued.

No change in format or content was specified in replies.

Present coverage should be expanded in future to include significant Free World and ChiCom events.

Improvement of timeliness of reporting required.

Comments almost unanimously favorable, and only one out of 75 responses asked to be taken off distribution.



REQUIREMENTS

/ overcollection, and

Commenting on the IG Survey on Collection Requirements Mr. Brandwein, D/FMSAC, on 9 February 1967 said that the Agency suffered from the proliferation of staffs and committees, task forces, working groups, etc. On the other hand it was not to be expected that the collection agents [ ] the CS Divisions, the satellite reconnaissance operators were going to volunteer to curtail their functions.

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As to the impact of the study on DDS&T, he felt S&T should comply with the spirit of the study and undertake a high level review of the whole requirements posture and of S&T's tech collection programs, even though this would not be a cure of the problem. He said



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He also (17 Feb 1967 in memo to A/DDS&T) recommended that CGS be divested of responsibility for rqmts for data exploitation and for intel collection by photographic and electronic sensors, because there already existed satisfactory mechanisms for keeping the books on tech exploitation and collection requirements. [ ]

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